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Abstract—Signature-based and protocol-based intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS) are employed as means to reveal content-based
network attacks. Such systems have proven to be effective in
identifying known intrusion attempts and exploits but they fail
to recognize new types of attacks or carefully crafted variants
of well known ones. This paper presents the design and the
development of an anomaly-based IDS technique which is able
to detect content-based attacks carried out over application level
protocols, like HTTP and FTP. In order to identify anomalous
packets, the payload is split up in chunks of equal length and the
n-gram technique is used to learn which byte sequences usually
appear in each chunk. The devised technique builds a different
model for each pair 〈protocol of interest, packet length〉 and uses
them to classify the incoming traffic. Models are build by means
of a semi-supervised approach. Experimental results witness that
the technique achieves an excellent accuracy with a very low false
positive rate.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection systems; Semi-supervised
learning; N-grams; Anomaly detection; FTP traffic;
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is a set of technologies, processes, means
and practices designed to protect computers, data, programs
interconnected from unauthorized access or attacks. Network
security is a crucial aspect of cyber security due to the
ubiquitous diffusion of the Internet. User authentication, data
encryption, avoiding programming errors and firewalls are
examples of protection techniques employed in order to im-
prove security, but they generally lack the capabilities of
protecting against malicious mobile code and insider attacks.
Therefore systems require an additional security layer, despite
the prevention techniques, and intrusion detection has proven
to be an effective wall against a broad range of network
attacks. Intrusion detection systems monitor the activities in
a computer system or network and analyse them to recog-
nise possible incidents, which are imminent threats or actual
violations of computer security policies or standard security
practices.
Intrusion detection is classified into two types: misuse
intrusion detection and anomaly intrusion detection. Misuse
intrusion detection uses patterns, also known as signatures,
that characterise known attacks, which exploit weaknesses
in systems and application software, to successfully identify
malicious activities. Anomaly intrusion detection aims at mod-
elling the normal usage behavior to identify signs of possible
intrusions.
There exist attacks which exploit some vulnerabilities of
a service or application by delivering a bad payload. It is
possible to detect these attacks by inspecting the packets
payload. A lot of IDS use n-grams for packets analysis [1],
some of such techniques are described in this section.
PAYL [2] uses 1-grams and unsupervised learning to build a
byte-frequency distribution model of network traffic payloads.
A 1-gram is simply a single byte with value in the range 0-255.
By preprocessing a packet payload in this way the technique
builds a feature vector containing the relative frequency count
of each of the 256 possible 1-grams in the payload. The model
also includes the average frequency, as well as the variance
and standard deviation as other features. Separate models of
normal traffic are created for each combination of destination
port and length of the flow. During the detection phase a
simplified Mahalanobis distance measure is used to compare
the current traffic to the model, and if the distance exceeds a
given threshold PAYL raises an alert. Testing was performed
on all attacks in the DARPA 1999 dataset using individual
packets and connections as data units. The overall detection
rate was close to 60% at a false positive rate less then 1%.
POSEIDON [3] is based on PAYL for the detection process,
while the preprocessing step is different. Unlike PAYL, the
output of a SOM classifier is used for determining whether to
create a separate model. The aim of the SOM is to identify
similar payloads for a given destination address and port. This
improvement was shown to produce less models and higher
accuracy than PAYL.
ANAGRAM [4] is also based on PAYL, but uses a mixture
of high-order n-grams with n > 1. This characteristic makes
the system less susceptible to mimicry attacks since higher
order n-grams are harder to emulate in padded bytes. By
contrast, it is possible to evade very easily PAYL if normal
byte frequencies are known, since malicious payloads can be
padded with bytes to match it. ANAGRAM uses supervised
learning to model normal traffic by storing legitimate n-grams
into one bloom filter, and models attack traffic by storing n-
grams from malicious packets into a separate bloom filter. At
runtime the n-grams from incoming payloads are compared
with those stored in the two filters. If the n-grams either match
the attack filter, or do not match the normal filter, the system
raises an anomaly.
Similarly, McPAD [5] creates 2v-grams and constructs dif-
ferent features spaces, which are handled by a different classi-
fier. A clustering algorithm is used to reduce dimensionality of
the future space, which is 2562 = 65536. Multiple one-class
SVMs are used for classification: their output are combined
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by a meta-classifier into a final classification prediction. The
results of testing McPAD showed it could detect shellcode
attacks in HTTP requests.
In [6], the authors model legitimate contents with high-
order n-grams, which are extracted from connection payloads.
Unsupervised anomaly detection is performed on the applica-
tion layer protocol bytes. Their approach differs from others
because each high-order n-gram is associated with a geometric
representation. n-grams and words in connection payloads are
compared using vectorial similarity measures such as distance
functions.
In this paper an anomaly-based intrusion detection tech-
nique is proposed, called Packet Chunk Anomaly Detector
(PCkAD), which uses n-grams and a novel preprocessing step
for the analysis of network packets payload. The system uses
protocol knowledge to identify the relevant parts of a packet
payload for the analysis and discard all the rest, subsequently
the useful payload is split up in not overlapping portions,
here called chunks, of equal length. The system models
normal behavior of clear and structured network contents in
an automatic and semi-supervised fashion. A packet payload
is recognized as anomalous if it contains too many never
seen n-grams or known n-grams whose distribution differs
considerably from that observed during the training phase. The
experiments were conducted on the dataset DARPA 1999 to
test the effectiveness of the proposed technique. The system
is able to get a detection rate of 100% with a false-positive
rate less than 1%, for the FTP traffic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details
the proposed technique. Section 3 presents the results and
evaluations of the method applied to the DARPA 1999 dataset.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNIQUE
This section describes the proposed technique, called
PCkAD, in detail. PCkAD uses n-grams (briefly described in
subsection 2.1) and a novel preprocessing step for the analysis
of network packets payload (subsection 2.2). Subsequently n-
grams are extracted from the contents of the network traffic
(subsection 2.3) and a model of normal behavior is built
(subsection 2.4) then the resulting model is used to identify
anomalous contents (subsection 2.5).
A. The n-gram technique
n-grams have been used previously in fields like information
retrieval [7] and statistical natural language processing [8].
With this technique it is possible to extract sequences of
symbols from a given input flow by using a sliding window
of length n. At each position a sequence of length n is
considered. Formally, the set S of features correspond to all
possible sequences of length n and is defined by:
S := {0, ..., 255}n. (1)
To show how the technique works, consider the artificial
payload x = “ooddod” where the set of all possible symbols
GET /people/svalente/gif/poker.dogs.jpg HTTP/1.0
Referer: http://marx.eyrie.af.mil/people/svalente/home.html
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.04 [en] (X11: I; SunOS 5.5 sun4u)
Host: marx.eyrie.af.mil
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/png, */*
Accept-Language: en
Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1,*,utf-8
Fig. 1. An example of HTTP packet payload. Only the URL following the
keyword GET is recognised as relevant content.
is restricted to “o” and “d”. If n = 2, the sequences that can be
extracted are “oo”, “od”, “dd”, “do”, and “od”, respectively.
The use of n-grams does not require expert domain knowl-
edge to construct relevant features, since a model of normality
can be built in an automatic fashion from the n-grams occur-
ring in a packet payload.
B. The preprocessing phase
Every time a new packet payload is observed, the system
exploits protocol knowledge to identify the relevant parts of
the payload for the analysis, while all the rest is discarded.
Subsequently the useful payload is split up in non-overlapping
portions of equal length, here referred to as chunks. More in
the detail, let Pp denote a packet payload and let Stpp denote
the set of all the basic components of the payload structure.
For instance, the basic components of the HTTP packet
payload are shown in Figure 1, and correspond to the
lines starting with following keywords: GET, Referer,
User-agent, Host, Accept, AcceptLanguage and
Accept-Charset.
By using protocol knowledge, the IDS selects the set
Svpp ⊆ Stpp of the components which are relevant for the
analysis. Every component cp in Svpp is then split up in non-
overlapping sequences of length lenck, in bytes, and the set
Ckcp is derived. The number of chunks nck that a component
can contain is defined by:
nck = dlenp/lencke, (2)
with lenp the length of the component.
Consider again the HTTP packet of Figure 1, which cor-
responds to a GET request. The system recognises the URL
following the keyword GET as the only relevant component
(GET and HTTP 1.0 are also included). If the length of a
single chunk is 15 bytes, then Ckcp will contain the following
chunks: “GET /people/sva”, “lente/gif/poker”,
“.dogs.jpg HTTP/”, and “1.0\r\n”.
C. The extraction phase
There exist many IDSs which use the n-gram technique
to analyze network packets payload, two examples are [4]
[3]. The n-grams are used to model the language which
characterizes a network traffic profile, since each different n-
gram is interpreted as a different feature of a feature space used
to represent the traffic. PCkAD extracts n-grams from a packet
payload after the preprocessing phase described in the previous
subsection. The packet payload is split in chunks to learn the
typical structure of a legitimate payload. By exploiting the
partitioning in chunks, it is possible for the system to know
GET / HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla/3.01 (Win95; I;)
Host: www.usatoday.com
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*
Fig. 2. A new HTTP packet payload is observed.
0 - GET / HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: Mo
30 - zilla/3.01 (Win95; I;)
Host:
60 - www.usatoday.com
Accept: imag
90 - e/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/
120 - jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*
Fig. 3. The payload is split up in chunks of equal length (30 bytes).
which are the typical n-grams of a legitimate network traffic
profile, how they are distributed, and where they are typically
located inside the payload. Only n-grams which occur in at
least a chunk are taken into account. Given a chunk c and a
n-gram s, s is said to occur in c if:
• either s is a subsequence of c, or
• a suffix (prefix, resp.) of s is a prefix (suffix, resp.) of c
and the remaining part of s is a suffix (prefix, resp.) of
the chunk preceding (succeeding, resp.) c.
The latter condition serves the purpose of taking into account
also n-grams located on the border between two consecutive
chunks.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show an example of how a packet
payload is processed by the IDS. In this example, each chunk
has a length of 30 bytes and the entire payload is considered
relevant for the analysis.
e/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/
Sliding window of length 5
0 4
Fig. 4. The IDS extracts a 5-gram from a chunk.
D. The model
The system models normal behavior of network traffic in an
automatic and semi-supervised fashion. In oder to build the
model of normal behavior, an off-line learning phase work-
ing on a training dataset containing only legitimate network
packets is accomplished by the IDS.
Initially, the system groups the packets in classes, based
on the following two criteria: (1) the observed port; (2) the
number of chunks a packet payload contains. Subsequently,
for each different class, a model is built that will be then
exploited to assess the nature of never seen packets.
The first criterion is needed in order to identify network
traffic profiles of different nature. Each protocol implies spe-
cific contents, so it is important to separate traffic pertain-
ing different protocols to capture information about specific
characteristics of the network profile. Differently, the resulting
classifier could exhibit a large misclassification rate. Clearly,
this strategy alone is inadequate to build accurate models. It is
possible to observe very different contents in the same profile.
In [2] it has been shown how the byte distribution of HTTP
packets vary among different length payload.
The second criterion is used to build a model from packets
with similar payload, therefore the chunks are used not only
in the analysis phase but also in the learning phase. The chunk
length influences considerably the building process, in that the
larger the size of a chunk, the smaller the number of models.
During the learning phase, for each built model and for
each observed n-gram, the average number and the standard
deviation of occurrences are computed and stored, both for
the entire relevant payload and for every single chunk. The
next section explains how these information are used in the
analysis process.
E. Anomalous packet detection
Many methods have been employed in order to check if
a packet is anomalous or not. Some techniques of intrusion
detection use a vectorial representation of the packets and the
achieved models then compute an anomaly index or score
by using a distance function [6]. The n-gram representation
fit well with this approach: each dimension corresponds to a
distinct n-gram and its value may be the frequency. However,
because of the introduction of chunks, this approach cannot
be directly applied in the proposed technique: n-grams could
occur in two or more chunks and for each of these chunks
different statistics (mean and standard deviation) are avail-
able. Thus, the adopted anomaly index is the percentage of
anomalous n-grams recognized in the relevant packet payload
which provides a quantitative measure of the size of anomalous
portion of the payload.
As an example, consider a HTTP GET request whose
relevant portion is the URL which corresponds to the GET
keyword. If the total number of n-grams is 100, and 45 of
them are recognized as anomalous, then the anomaly score
evaluates to 45%.
The simplified Mahalanobis distance is exploited to evaluate
if a known n-gram is unusual or non-legitimate within the
entire payload or a single chunk. In this work, we used the
simplified assumption that the bytes are statistically indepen-
dent, so the Mahalanobis distance between the feature vector
of a specific payload and the model associated with the same
payload is defined by:
d(~x, ~M) =
N−1∑
i=0
|µi − xi|
σi
, (3)
where N is the size of the set of all the possible n-grams,
µi is the average number of occurrences of the i-th n-gram
in the model (aka legitimate profile) ~M and σi is its standard
deviation, while xi is the count of the i-th n-gram in the feature
vector ~x associated with the observed packet payload.
Notice that, if an n-gram never appears in the training
samples or it appears with exactly the same frequency in each
sample, the standard deviation σi evaluates to zero. To avoid
the distance to become infinite, a smoothing factor α is added
up to the standard deviation, leading to the following formula:
d(~x, ~M) =
N−1∑
i=0
|µi − xi|
σi + α
. (4)
Intuitively, the smoothing factor α gives information about
the statistical confidence of the sampled training data. The
confidence the samples are truly representative of the actual
distribution is inversely proportional to α, so for large values
of α the byte distribution can be more variable.
Here the Mahalanobis distance is not fully used, but rather
its terms are exploited separately in order to decide if an n-
gram is unusual or not. In particular, consider vnp and vnc as
the feature vectors representing the normal profile for the en-
tire relevant payload and for each chunk c respectively and vp
and vc as the feature vectors of a new packet payload observed
for the entire payload and for each chunk c respectively. When
a new packet is observed the system uses the Mahalanobis
distance to compute the difference between each component
of vnp and vp, for the i-th n-gram:
d(vnp, vp)i =
|µi − xi|
σi + α
(5)
the term d(vnp, vp)i is then compared with a threshold ths: if
d(vnp, vp)i > ths the n-gram is said to be unusual (aka, non-
legitimate), otherwise it is usual (aka, legitimate). The same
approach holds for vnc and vc. An n-gram is recognized as
anomalous if one of the following conditions holds:
• it has never been observed in the normal traffic: in this
case all its occurrences are identified as anomalous;
• it has been observed in the normal traffic, but it is
unusual in the entire relevant payload: in this case all
its occurrences are identified as anomalous;
• it has been observed in the normal traffic and it is usual
in the entire relevant payload, but it is anyway unusual
in at least a chunk: in this case only the occurrences
unusually distributed are considered anomalous.
For each packet payload the system computes: the total
number of n-grams (totseqs); the number of anomalous n-
grams (aseqs). Afterward an anomalous score, ascore, is
computed:
ascore =
aseqs
totseqs
· 100 (6)
A different threshold has been defined for each analyzed
protocol. If there is a low degree of variability in the contents
of the network traffic of a specific protocol it is appropriate to
use a low threshold, while on the contrary a higher threshold
is needed to tolerate a reasonable level of variability.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section a set of experiments designed to test the
effectiveness of the proposed technique is presented.
Experiments were conducted on the dataset DARPA 1999.
The 1999 DARPA IDS [9] data set was collected at MIT
Lincoln Labs to evaluate intrusion detection systems. All
the network traffic was recorded in tcpdump format and
provided for evaluation. Additionally, there are also audit logs,
daily file system dumps, and BSM (Solaris system call) logs.
The data consists of three weeks of training data and two
weeks of test data. The training data contains two weeks of
attack-free data and one week of data with labeled attacks.
This dataset has been used in many research efforts and
results of tests involving this data have been reported in many
publications. Although there are problems due to the nature of
the simulation environment that created the data [10], it still
remains a useful set of data to compare techniques. In [11]
the best results are reported.
In the experiments only the inside HTTP and FTP network
traffic data which was captured between the router and the
victims was used. It is important to notice that not all the
types of payloads are suitable to be analyzed with n-grams.
If n-grams are blindly constructed from all packet payloads
including unstructured and, in particular, encrypted data, then
a huge range of n-grams would be created and the resulting
model would not be able to distinguish between normal and
anomalous traffic in a satisfactory way. Therefore only clear
and structured payloads are considered. The inbound TCP traf-
fic to the ports 80 and 21 of the hosts 172.016.xxx.xxx
was examined, since it contains most of the victims. Each
packet in the dataset was used as the data unit. The configura-
tion set up is similar to that chosen to evaluate PAYL [2] and
POSEIDON [3], two other intrusion detection techniques, so
that a comparison with PCkAD could be done. The system was
trained on the DARPA dataset using week 1 (5 days, attack
free) and week 3 (7 days, attack free). The detector was then
evaluated on weeks 4 and 5, which contain 201 instances of
58 different attacks, 177 of which are visible in the inside
tcpdump data. In the experiments only the HTTP and FTP
traffic is considered, so the attacks using protocols TCP, UDP,
ICMP, ARP (address resolution protocol) and IP are not treated
here.
Traffic flows directed to different ports have different byte
variability, e.g. the HTTP payloads (port 80) are usually
less variable than those of SMTP (port 25). Hence, different
thresholds were set for each protocol, in particular, their values
has been derived empirically so that the false-positive rate
would be less than 1%. It was set a threshold of 40% for
FTP and a threshold of 30% for HTTP. Other configuration
parameters are: the smoothing factor α: it was set to 0.1, a
reasonable value for this dataset; the length of a single chunk,
in bytes; the value of n, for the n-grams. The experiments
were set up to assess how the chunks and the n-grams affect
the system performance. The reported results concern only the
analysis of the FTP traffic because most of the attacks directed
towards HTTP-based application where recognized because of
the following reasons:
• the IDS identifies malformed HTTP requests easily by
using protocol knowledge, like the crashiis attack
which sends “GET ../..” as a request;
• there exist many attack packets whose characteristics
are very different from those observed in the legiti-
mate packets of the training data set, so it does not
exist a model for the packet classification. This means
that the system automatically classify these packets as
anomalous. An example of such attack is apache2, a
DoS attack, which sends requests with a lot of repeated
“User-Agent:sioux\r\n”.
During the analysis of the FTP traffic, about 3000 FTP packets
sent by the same source host, which is sending FTP commands
in a way that is typical of the Telnet protocol (one character per
packet, with the TCP flag PUSH set), were found. Although
it is normal traffic, this behaviour was never observed in the
training data set. Currently the system is not able to handle
payloads containing only one character, because it uses high
order n-grams. Therefore these packets were not taken into
account to assess the effectiveness of PCkAD. The treatment of
this aspect is planned for future work. The same consideration
holds for POSEIDON too [3], while PAYL [2] works with 1-
grams so it should be able to handle this scenario.
The variant of the technique where chunks are disabled is
used as baseline for the evaluation. Table 1 reports the results
about the influence of the length of a single chunk on the
analysis process, with n = 3. lenck, drck, drw, fprck and
fprw denote respectively: the length of a chunk (in bytes),
the detection rate with chunks enabled, the detection rate with
chunks disabled, the false-positive rate with chunks enabled
and the false-positive rate with chunks disabled.
TABLE I
RESULTS OF n-GRAMS ANALYSIS OF FTP NETWORK TRAFFIC WITH AND
WITHOUT CHUNKS.
lenck drck drw fprck fprw
7 84.2% 78.9% 0.691% 0.596%
15 100% 73.7% 0.588% 0.555%
20 84.2% 84.2% 0.518% 0.518%
25 73.7% 73.7% 0.526% 0.498%
39 63.2% 63.2% 0.358% 0.358%
As can be seen in the table, sometimes the chunks have a
positive influence on the analysis process, although typically
the system produces a greater number of false-positive when
they are enabled, however this increase is very small so
the results can be considered positive. Without chunks, with
lenck = 7, the system is not able to recognize properly
a specific attack instance so the detection rate goes down
slightly. With lenck = 15 the detection rate increases from
73, 7% to 100% using chunks, while the false-positive rate
goes up imperceptibly. In the remaining configurations the
chunks affect the results a little or nothing at all. It may happen
that the system is able to recognize anomalous packets only
due to never seen n-grams, in this scenario the chunks have a
very low influence.
The effectiveness of the chunks depends on the nature of
the models, so the length of a chunk has a great importance
in the training phase. Too low values lead to the production
of many models, this means that a lot of packets with similar
payloads are split up in different classes. On the other hand,
too high values would have the opposite effect, many packets
with different payloads would be grouped together. Another
experiment was set up to assess if the n-grams are able to
influence the analysis process as well. If the value is too low
then the set of all possible n-grams the system can learn is
relatively small, so it would be harder to recognize attack
instances. With high values it is easier for the system to
recognize anomalous packets, but it is also easier to produce
a greater number of false-positive. In the previous experiment
only 3-grams have been used; next 2-grams and 5-grams will
be evaluated. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the results with 2-grams
and 5-grams.
TABLE II
2-GRAMS ANALYSIS OF FTP NETWORK TRAFFIC (lenck = 20).
threshold drck drw fprck fprw
40% 10.56% 10.56% 0.39% 0.35%
30% 36.84% 36.84% 1.03% 0.58%
25% 57.89% 57.89% 1.77% 0.79%
15% 78.9% 78.9% 8.02% 4.56%
TABLE III
2-GRAMS ANALYSIS OF FTP NETWORK TRAFFIC (lenck = 15).
threshold drck drw fprck fprw
30% 42.1% 36.8% 0.67% 0.59%
25% 78.9% 68.4% 1.04% 0.83%
15% 94.7% 78.9% 6.02% 4.63%
TABLE IV
5-GRAMS ANALYSIS OF FTP NETWORK TRAFFIC (lenck = 15).
threshold drck drw fprck fprw
40% 100% 100% 1.27% 1.23%
50% 100% 100% 1.07% 1.03%
60% 100% 100% 0.93% 0.89%
When n is set to 2 it is difficult for the system to detect
attack instances, while for n = 5 the detection rate is very
high, but the false-positive rate also goes up. As table 2 and 3
show, with 2-grams high false-positive rate can be observed,
especially with threshold 15%. By taking into account the
low discriminating power of 2-grams, the resulting models
are not able to classify never seen packets properly. These
results confirm the previous considerations. In the light of the
results observed, it is reasonable to say that greater values of n
would lead to higher false-positive rate while with 1-grams it
would be even more difficult for the system to recognise attack
instances. In the first case it would be required a large amount
of resources for system administrators to check the alarms
generated from the IDS, instead in the second case the false-
negative rate would goes up. Table 5 compares the PCkAD’s
performance with those of PAYL and POSEIDON, with the
false positive rate lower than 1% for all the techniques.
PAYL and POSEIDON are described in more details in the
introduction. It is interesting to note that PCkAD is able to
get a detection rate of 100%, like POSEIDON and better than
PAYL and it is able to get the smallest false-positive rate
among the three techniques.
TABLE V
COMPARISON AMONG PCKAD (N = 3, lenck = 15), PAYL AND
POSEIDON; DR = DETECTION RATE, FPR = FALSE-POSITIVE RATE.
PAYL POSEIDON PCkAD
DR 94.7% 100% 100%
FPR 0.93% 0.93% 0.588%
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper it was presented an anomaly-based intrusion
detection technique, called Packet Chunk Anomaly Detector
(PCkAD), which uses n-grams and a novel preprocessing
step for the analysis of network packets payload. The system
models the normal behaviour of network traffic profile, in an
automatic and semi-supervised fashion. The resulting models
are used to classify unseen packets. Two experiments were set
up to assess the effectiveness of the proposed technique and
the DARPA 1999 dataset was used. The system is able to get a
detection rate of 100% with a false-positive rate less than 1%,
for the FTP traffic. A comparison among PCkAD, PAYL and
POSEIDON is reported; PCkAD and POSEIDON share the
same detection rate, which is the highest, moreover PCkAD
has got the lowest false-positive rate.
The PCkAD technique can be improved by trying to de-
crease even more the false-positive rate and its robustness can
be better assessed by considering other experimental scenarios.
Another relevant direction of research is being currently taking
into account is the handling of concept drift by means of
weighted ensembles of classifiers exploiting the basic strategy
here presented.
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